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John Thrasher, Chapman University

Political contractualism is important in societies characterized by substantial moral and political disagreement and diversity.
The very disagreement that makes the social contract necessary, however, also makes agreement difﬁcult. Call this the
paradox of diversity, which is the result of a tension between two necessary conditions of political contractualism: existence
and stability. The ﬁrst involves showing the possibility of some agreement, while the second involves showing that the
agreement can persist. To solve both of these problems, I develop a multilevel contract theory that I call the “open society”
model of political contractualism that incorporates diversity into the contractual model at different levels solving the existence problem, while avoiding fragility in the face of the stability problem. This approach is able to take advantage of the
beneﬁts of institutional diversity while providing a stable framework for productive political disagreement.

D

iversity—differences in fundamental religious, political, and moral beliefs and norms within a society—is at the heart of social contract theory and its
political manifestation, liberalism. In diverse societies that
do not share a uniform moral, political, or religious foundations some basis in agreement over stable rules and norms
is necessary that does not appeal to the various doctrines on
which we disagree. Political contractualism is the view that
we need agreement on our basic political principles because
we often agree on little else.1 Those principles, constructed
in the right way, allow us to disagree fruitfully and to organize ourselves cooperatively without the need to pursue a
common social project over and above a commitment to the
basic political principles that unify us.
Disagreement and diversity create the need for a social
contract that can unify divergent interests and values into a
common political system, but it is puzzling how people who
fundamentally disagree about so much could come to any
agreement at all. Call this the existence problem of political
contractualism: is any agreement at all possible and, if so,
under what circumstances? Much of the interesting work
in contractualist theory is related to this existence question;

to devising models and experimenting with idealizations
and speciﬁcations of the preferences, beliefs, and circumstances of the parties to the potential agreement to show that
agreement is possible. A second question concerns the stability of any such agreement. Assuming an agreement is
possible, will it survive in the face of change, both external
and internal? Further, how robust is it in the face of diversity?
Given these two problems, there is a paradox at the heart
of political contractualism in the face of diversity. Attempts
to solve the existence problem often rely on assumptions that
effectively reduce the diversity of the interests and beliefs
of the parties to the contract. Even if this kind of strategy
solves the existence problem, however, it can make it harder
or impossible to solve the stability problem once diversity
is reintroduced. I develop this problem before looking at
how it is possible to solve it by embracing and harnessing
diversity at several different theoretical and practical levels. I
conclude by arguing that a social contract that takes diversity seriously will be the basis of a dynamic society not based
on a ﬁxed consensus but, rather, as a framework for an open
society where we agree in order to disagree peacefully and
fruitfully.

John Thrasher (johnthrasher23@gmail.com) is an assistant professor in the Philosophy Department and the Smith Institute for Political Economy and
Philosophy at Chapman University in Orange, CA 92866.
1. It is common to distinguish between “contractarians” and “contractualists.” The former are typically meant to be inﬂuenced by the Hobbesian
interpretation of the social contract, for instance, James Buchanan (2000), David Gauthier (1986), and, more recently, Michael Moehler (2018) and Ryan
Muldoon (2017); while contractualists have a more Kantian approach derived primarily from the work of T. M. Scanlon (1998). This division is unwieldy
and misleading in any number of ways and I avoid it, calling all those who defend a contractual method of justiﬁcation simply “contractualists.” Here I
follow Nic Southwood’s (2010) ecumenism with regard to “contractualism.”
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THE PARADOX OF DIVERSITY
Political contractualism is a vision of a society of individuals
cooperating together on mutually beneﬁcial terms on which
they can all voluntarily agree. It is a simple idea that has interesting implications. Abstracting from the particulars of
many different contractualist theories, we can develop a
general model of political contractualism that has the form:
General model of political contractualism. N chooses
R in M and this gives N* reason to endorse and comply
with R in the real world insofar as the reasons N has for
choosing R in M can be shared by N*.
This model is made up of two sets of agents (N and N*), a
deliberative model of agreement (M) and a set of target
rules or principles (R). The agents in the deliberative model
are model choosers that are meant to represent the reasons
of actual people outside of the deliberative model (N*). This
model can take any number of forms based on its parameters and speciﬁcations, though the exact details of a particular version of contractualism are not important at this
stage. This model is represented in ﬁgure 1.
Once there is a set of social rules (R) that individuals (N)
can agree to, the existence problem has been effectively
solved. But, since political contractualism is meant to be a
normative standard for some existing or potential society,
the model can only serve its function if it is relevantly related
to the real people and situations it is meant to represent.2
There must be a relationship between the real people looking
at the standards of their own society and the individuals in
the contractual model. Speciﬁcally, there needs to be a representation function between the reasoning of the individuals in the model agreement procedure and actual individuals. This relationship explicates the relationship between
the reasons of the agents in the contractual model and the
reasons of real people outside the model. The reasons of the
representatives in the choice situation are meant to model
our reasons; at least the reasons we have as political agents
or citizens. As Rawls notes, contractual justiﬁcation is not
a “mere proof ” (1999b, 508), nor is it merely reasoning correctly from given or generally accepted premises to conclusions
(1980, 518). Rather, the normative task is to make explicit the
reasoning that connects our standpoint as persons with de-

2. On this representation condition and the special problems of relating
the reason of N to N*, see Thrasher (2019). This conception of representation
raises its own questions, but it is not totally distinct from other senses of
representation in political theory (Rehfeld 2011, 2017) and in the philosophy
of science in relation to “models” generally (e.g., Cartwright and Le Poidevin
1991; Colyvan 2013; Giere 2004; Weisberg 2007a, 2007b).

Figure 1. General model of contractualism

terminate interests and goals to our standpoint as citizens. The
contractual model is a “device of representation” that connects
our reasons with the reasons of our representatives in the
contractual choice procedure (Rawls 1996, 24–27). This connection between the reasons of agents in the model and reasons of ordinary persons is the link that gives rational choice
in the model normative power.3
To show that this kind of justiﬁcation is possible, the
political contractualist must show two things: (1) that some
agreement on R in M is possible and (2) that the rules or
principles agreed to (R) would continue to engender support in the face of diversity. Call the ﬁrst the existence
problem and the second the stability problem.
One way to solve the existence problem is to smooth out
the differences between the parties to the agreement. This can
be done in two ways. One is to impose limits on what the
contractual agents can want or know, that is, reduce evaluative and/or doxastic diversity. Reducing doxastic diversity
often has the effect of also limiting evaluative diversity and
vice versa. The veil of ignorance, for instance, limits what
contractual representatives know about themselves but also
limits what they can plausibly value. People coming together
to choose what rules they can live under will be unable to
choose rules that beneﬁt their own distinctive interests insofar as they do not know precisely what their interests are
likely to be and precisely how the rules will affect those interests. As Rawls argues, reducing the information available
to the parties is essential to generating a determinate result in
the original position (1999b, 121).
This strategy to solve the existence problem, however,
creates a tension with the stability problem. Reducing diversity may make the ﬁrst problem more tractable, but given
the normal functioning of a free society, diversity will inevitably reemerge. Rawls, recognizing this problem, developed

3. A core aspect of this representation condition is what Rawls calls
the “publicity condition.” Sam Freeman (2007) makes the case that publicity is essential for the normative link between model contractors and
actual people.
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a more diversity friendly version of political contractualism
in his later work. Even there, however, Rawls (1996, 58) is
clear that he is only concerned with what he calls “reasonable” pluralism. The modiﬁer “reasonable” and it meaning
has spawned a substantial literature in its own right and,
despite this, there is still no consensus on how to precisely
characterize this idea. Scanlon (1998) has, in his version of
contractualism, done the most to make sense of what “reasonableness” amounts to, but in so doing he also creates a
unique version of contractualism that poses its own theoretical challenges. One way to make sense of “reasonableness,” or at least the role it plays in Rawls’s theory, is to see it
as a less radical version of the veil of ignorance, in the sense
that it reduces the possible diversity of values and beliefs that
contractors may have. The key difference is that reasonableness is not an informational constraint on what the
contractors know or over the possible outcome they can rank;
it does not unify their utility functions and their reasons for
choice in the original position. Instead, reasonableness is a
constraint on the possible utility functions of the choosers in
the original position and in society generally. It functions as a
way to reduce evaluative diversity in the model of choice.
This restriction of diversity makes it possible, according to
Rawls, for a society of people who may otherwise disagree
about the good and much of the right to be able to ﬁnd some
core that can serve as a basis of an overlapping consensus that
will remain stable over time.
So far, we have seen two main forms of diversity: doxastic
and evaluative. Doxastic or informational diversity is reduced in contractual theories through some device like a veil
of ignorance (Rawls 1999b) or veil of uncertainty (Brennan
and Buchanan 2000; Buchanan 2000). Evaluative diversity is
managed by constraining the utility functions or preferences
that individuals may hold. We are now in a position to see
how the strategy of reducing diversity in order to solve the
existence problem is in tension with solving the stability
problem. Call this the paradox of diversity. It is composed of
several claims.
1. Diversity generates the conditions that make a
social contract necessary.
2. Diversity creates disagreement, making it more
difﬁcult to ﬁnd agreement on any social contract
(the existence problem).
3. Solving the existence problem requires that one or
both forms of diversity be reduced.
4. Stable agreements must engender their own support over time in the face of diversity.
5. Solving the existence problem by reducing diversity
makes any agreement fragile in the face of diver-

sity, thereby making the stability problem harder to
solve.
If one reduces diversity in order to generate agreement, not
only is the point of generating agreement undermined, it may
also make the contract less stable. Any agreement that requires limited diversity will likely be fragile in the face of
increased diversity. On the other hand, if one does not reduce
diversity, agreement may be impossible or, at least, it might
be impossible to show that any agreement will be possible or
unique.4
This is certainly a core problem in contractualist theory,
but it is more than that; it is also an important practical
political problem. Diversity can creep into the political system in any number of ways. Even a society that is relatively
homogeneous will tend to drift into more diversity over time.
Things tend toward diversity and, in a thermodynamic sense
at least, disorder. This is welcomed, with perhaps only two
cheers, as the inevitable “creative destruction” of a free society (Schumpeter 1994).5 Freedom of speech, expression,
and media make the creation and transmission of new ideas
easy and natural. Even if somehow this process could be
checked, perhaps by an extremely authoritarian state, diversity would likely emerge from external inﬂuences—through
trade or other interactions with outside societies (Sparrow
2016).
This paradox does not claim that solving the existence
problem will necessarily undermine stability. Instead, it
shows that the tension between stability and existence is a
potentially serious and perennial political problem—one
with important implications. The key point is to recognize
that existence and stability are two necessary conditions of
a successful political contractualist theory that are linked
together and related to diversity. We cannot simply solve
the existence problem without considering the stability problem or vice versa.
The typical strategy to approaching these two problems
has been to try to solve the existence problem and then show
how that solution can be stable under various conditions. In
the next several sections, recognizing the relationship between existence, stability, and diversity, I will argue that we
can take a different approach and look to solve the existence
problem by ﬁrst looking at stability. This is because stability
4. The question for uniqueness in the solution to the existence problem
may be creating many of the problems that are raised in the paradox of
diversity; see Thrasher (2014).
5. The ability to generate and thrive in the face of “creative destruction” is one of the key elements of what Douglass North, John Wallis, and
Barry Weingast (2009, 116–17) call “open-access orders” and what I will
describe, more generally, as the “open society.”
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in a free society has a peculiar form that requires diversity and
change to be built into it. By recognizing this, the existence
problem becomes more tractable, though different, once we
approach it from the point of view of stability.

THE STABILITY PROBLEM
One solution to the problem posed in the last section is
to deny that stability is an important feature of a wellfunctioning and just society. Good societies, or at least good
places to live, tend to be those that are vibrant and changing, not those that stand still—too much stability can be a
bad thing.
Rawls distinguishes between two kinds of stability (1996,
142), one, necessary and proper for a contractual society and
the other, less so. The ﬁrst is the practical problem of ensuring that the political principles or constitution can persist
and “as long as the means of persuasion or enforcement can
be found” to maintain support, the society is stable (Rawls
1996, 142). We can think of many nonliberal societies (e.g.,
DPRK, USSR, the PRC) that have been remarkably stable in
this sense, despite not having the voluntary support of their
people. Rawls contrasts this kind of stability with another,
more normatively interesting, form of stability that he calls
“stability for the right reasons” (1996, xliii). Stability in this
sense is the ability of a social order to appeal to the free public
reason of equal citizens (1996, 143). As Rawls (1995, 146) notes
in his reply to Habermas, showing that stability for the right
reasons is possible in a pluralistic, diverse society is crucial to
the project of public justiﬁcation. In this way, stability is essential for legitimacy in both the practical and normative sense.
Stability is a test on the reasonableness of the “public moral
constitution” of a society (Rawls 1974, 12; 1996, 143).
This normative conception of stability is not an idiosyncratic feature of Rawls’s contractualism; it is shared by
Gauthier (1986, 230) as well. For both Gauthier and, perhaps
more surprisingly, Rawls, the concept of stability has its roots
in the idea of “equilibrium” drawn from game theory and
economics (Gaus and Thrasher 2015). As Rawls writes in
A Theory of Justice, stability is an equilibrium where the
principles of justice are “collectively rational,” that is, rational
from each person’s point of view (1999b, 435). He directly
compares his idea of the well-ordered society to the concept
of equilibrium in economics (1999a, 235). Although this
conception of stability is developed considerably beyond its
use in economics, it may still be helpful to look at the way
the idea is used by economists to identify various ways that
states of affairs can be both stable and dynamically changing. There are many such stability concepts in economics
and game theory, and the range of ideas should alert us to the
possibilities that there may be many such concepts available.
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One is the Nash concept of stability in noncooperative
games. This idea of stability is an equilibrium concept
whereby strategies are in equilibrium if no player will beneﬁt from unilaterally changing strategies—if a strategy is
the best reply to everyone else’s best reply (Nash 1950).
This is a core notion in economics, and it helps to deﬁne
the properties of an economy in general equilibrium. This
idea, however, is in an important sense static. It tells us that
an economy, once it achieves a particular state will tend
to stay there, but it does not tell us anything about the
process that may or may not lead to that equilibrium state
or how robust that equilibrium will be to internal or external changes. We can describe this Nash conception of
stability as a ﬁxed-point conception of stability. Whatever
may change in the system or state of affairs, that system will
be stable if there is some ﬁxed point that does not change
in the system. What Rawls calls “inherent stability” in A
Theory of Justice is a good example of a ﬁxed-point conception of stability (Thrasher and Vallier 2018).
Stability, however, need not be understood as a ﬁxed
point in the sense that the principles that govern a society
must remain the same over time. This point is also instructive in the political context. The constitutional settlement in the United States, for instance, has not remained
the same over the last several centuries, but, despite this, the
United States has continued to be governed by the same
general principles. The American example shows that stability need not be primarily concerned with remaining the
same but, rather, with creating a constitutional framework
under which the political system can evolve in a constructive way along with the needs of the populace.
For instance, one of the most important challenges facing
contemporary democracies, especially in Europe, is the challenge of diversity posed by increased migration of people from
other parts of the world and, importantly, other religious,
moral, and political traditions. Recent migration has caused a
huge increase in doxastic as well as evaluative diversity and
threatens the stability of the existing European constitutional
settlement. Evidence of this can be found in the increased
popularity of radical populist movements on the left and right.
The most salient recent examples include Marine LePen’s
Front National (FN) in France, Alternative für Deutschland
(AFD) in Germany, Golden Dawn in Greece, and, arguably,
the Corbynite Labour Party as well as the ruling faction of the
Conservative Party in Britain. All of these have seen surprising
electoral success in recent elections. The most surprising and,
perhaps most troubling, reaction to increased diversity has
been the election of Donald Trump in the United States.
To address the challenges that diversity poses, we can develop a notion of dynamic stability. Rather than an equilibrium
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conception, dynamic stability should be understood as a robustness test on a political or social constitution.6 Of course,
dynamic stability in this sense will also assume a certain
amount of disharmony in the society. This is true in federal
constitutions where there is often some important tension
between the different political levels (Levy 2007). It is not
harmony then that deﬁnes the stability of a dynamic system.
Instead, a constitution embodying a political contractual
agreement is dynamically stable insofar as its existence conditions persist in the face of signiﬁcant diversity. What “signiﬁcant” amounts to here will vary, but a dynamically stable
constitution should be robust in the face of the diversity it is
likely to face at maximum levels of feasible freedom. Dynamic
stability is the result of a relatively ﬁxed constitutional or
contractual structure that ﬁxes, in a very general way, basic
fundamental principles, while allowing the exact institutional
structure of a society to change considerably within that
structure. Open societies do not try to settle all important
questions, even all the important questions of justice. Instead,
they settle some essential questions and create a durable
framework for answering, in a provisional way, other questions in the course of social and political life. Consensus, in
this broad sense, is not the goal of an open society but, rather,
ongoing, structured dispute.
Consensus is the gold standard of politics. To achieve
consensus is to reach unanimity, which is to say universal
assent. No policy or principles that are ratiﬁed by a consensus
can claim to silence some voices, or to speak only for the
majority. Or so it seems. In the search for consensus, we see
the paradox of diversity raise its head once again. Consensus
is difﬁcult to achieve in the face of diverse values and beliefs
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006; Gaus 2016b; Kogelmann 2017).
Consensus must, in a diverse society, be bought at a signiﬁcant price. As we saw with the paradox of diversity, disagreement and diversity can be reduced or eliminated to
generate agreement or consensus, but the piper needs to be
paid at some point—diversity will inevitably reenter the political system. When it does, political systems that have been
painstakingly constructed to generate agreement or consensus given certain assumptions will likely not remain stable
in the face of increased diversity. Consensus-based theories
of stability will tend to be fragile (Thrasher and Vallier 2015).

6. Ryan Muldoon (2017) develops an innovative dynamic social contract theory that, nevertheless, relies on what I am calling a static equilibrium
concept, speciﬁcally the Nash bargaining solution. His theory, as a whole, is
dynamic because the social contractors—or at least their perspectives—are
constantly changing and, hence, the bargaining solution generates different
results over time. His theory does not propose a “ﬁnal” social contract that is
meant to be stable in the face of changing perspectives (Muldoon 2017, 120).

THE EXISTENCE PROBLEM
Although we are often concerned with agreement at the level
of the social contract in our theories, it is at the democratic,
institutional level that the real beneﬁts of diversity can
be brought to bear. In a general sense, institutions can be
understood as structures of norms or stable equilibrium
strategies (Schotter 2008). Thinking about political contractualism in the context of institutions may show how diversity can be integrated into contractualist theory while
avoiding the paradox of diversity. Much of political theory,
especially in the realm of democratic theory and social choice
theory, sees political outcomes as a function of the beliefs
and preferences of citizens ﬁltered through some aggregation rule. Here, we will look at things differently. Imagine
political institutions as a function that generates social outcomes given several constraints and parameters. The input is
still the beliefs and preferences of individuals, but the domain
of options is constrained by the foundational contract and
constitutional structure. The institutions will set the agendas
and the aggregation rules, and ﬁlter the results. To evaluate
any outcomes, then, will require referencing the institutions
in question.
Without going beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
the exact nature of these institutions, we can highlight three
features that would contribute to stability by harnessing diversity to generate better political outcomes. These are innovation, accountability, and robustness.

INNOVATION
The ﬁrst and most obvious beneﬁt of diversity in the context
of institutions is innovation. Only when there are genuine
differences in opinion and ideas about important matters is
it possible to generate novel ideas and different approaches
to old problems. This idea is at the heart of the Millian defense of freedom and diversity. In the contemporary context,
Elizabeth Anderson (2006), Fred D’Agostino (2010), Gerald
Gaus (2016b), Hélène Landemore (2012), Ryan Muldoon
(2017), and others have argued that a similar defense of an
innovative political system has many virtues.
In addition, many have touted the ability of diversity to
aid democratic decision making. These approaches can be
lumped together under the name “diversity trumps ability”
(Anderson 2006). The core idea comes from work by Scott
Page and his collaborator Lu Hong (2004). Although their
model is somewhat complex mathematically, the basic idea
is that a group of problem solvers who see the problem in
question differently (but not too differently) will tend to
outperform and, in some special circumstances always outperform, more knowledgeable or talented but less diverse
groups. These results have been adapted and applied in the
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context of democratic decision making by several thinkers.
Hélène Landemore (2012) uses the “diversity trumps ability”
results of Hong and Page in defense of an inclusive form of
diverse deliberative democracy. Elizabeth Anderson (2006)
uses the results of Hong and Page to argue in favor of greater
inclusiveness and integration of society as a whole. The beneﬁts of diversity give us a powerful reason, she argues, for
favoring institutions that bring different types of people together and for reducing various forms of social segregation
(Anderson 2013).
Despite criticisms (Gaus 2016b; Thompson 2014), there is
something important to the idea that diverse groups of
people can solve some problems better than more homogeneous groups. The important question is how and at what
margin. Even if the particular theorem from Hong and Page
is not the right model for thinking about doxastic or evaluative diversity, there are other models that tout the value of
diversity in other ways (Thoma 2015; Weisberg and Muldoon 2009; Zollman 2009). These, however, also have their
critics (Bruner 2019; O’Connor 2017; O’Connor and Bruner
2019).
Regardless of the particular model, the basic idea is that
diversity, in the right institutional environment, is essential
to innovation. The beneﬁts of innovation will not always be
shared by all, and those with conservative temperaments will
likely rebel against innovation in general. Still, as Mill and
others point out, innovation is crucial to the future of our
society since we do not yet know what future challenges we
will face or what possibilities are available to us. There is no
way to accurately calibrate the level of innovation to ensure
that it only generates results that we want. The open society,
in this sense, is a society that is open not only to new ideas
but also to disagreement. Only a robust marketplace of ideas
will be able to make the case for some and against other
innovations.

ACCOUNTABILITY
This idea of maximum diversity and innovation can be
coupled with the importance of humility and epistemic
fallibalism. This, too, is a core Millian (and Popperian) idea.
We improve as a society by seeing which of our ideas are
wrong, outdated, or no longer useful. The “selection pressures” in the biological analogy occur as ideas are subjected to
public scrutiny or, to echo Thomas Jefferson, to the “bar of
public reason.” There is considerable evidence that individuals will consider evidence more carefully and deliberate more
when they are expected to justify their conclusions publicly
(D’Agostino 2010, 65–66). Making people accountable for
their ideas in public can provide the selection pressure necessary to ﬁlter and sort ideas.
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This is important because of recent ﬁndings in moral and
political psychology suggesting that reasoned deliberation
about morals or politics may be the exception rather than
the rule. In particular Jonathan Haidt and his collaborators
have shown that especially when it comes to political or
moral conclusions our judgments come ﬁrst and reasoning
comes afterward (Greene and Haidt 2002; Haidt 2001). That is,
we make judgments intuitively or emotionally and then use
reason to justify our conclusions to ourselves and others. According to Haidt, we reason like lawyers rather than judges,
ﬁnding reasons for conclusions that we already believe. Josh
Greene, using similar results, has argued that this is good evidence that much of our moral (and political) judgments are
driven by mere affect and not by reason (Greene 2008). Jesse
Prinz (2008) has gone even further and argued that all of
morality is based solely on the emotions.
All of this looks like bad news for notions of accountability
and liberalism insofar as the latter is linked to the project of
subjecting political programs to the test of public justiﬁcation
and public reason. If what we call “public reasoning” is really
just a clash of nonrational judgments and competing affects,
any pretensions to the legitimacy of democratic governance
on the basis of anything like public reason look shaky. This
also seems to undermine the basic notions of accountability
and transparency that underlie many democratic institutions
as well. No matter how ofﬁcially transparent our institutions
are, decisions are still made in the murky recesses of our
emotional minds.
This verdict is too quick, though, and the reason why
highlights beneﬁts of diversity and democracy, at least in the
right kinds of institutional settings. Haidt and company may
be right about the limitations of individual reasoners—it is
too easy to convince ourselves that we are right. A similar case
can be made against deliberative settings that aim at consensus. Cognitive limitations coupled with the problems
Haidt poses often lead to “discourse failures” in deliberative
democratic settings (Pincione and Tesón 2006) and even
group polarization (Sunstein 2002). In these settings, diversity is also often disvalued and reduced (Landemore and Page
2014). Further, when information is costly, many of these
problems will multiply and lead to worse (McCubbins and
Rodriguez 2006) and more fragile group decisions.
There is a silver lining, however. We are very bad at
ﬁnding reasons against our favored point of view, but we are
very good at picking out the holes in other people’s moral
or political judgments. When we reason alone or when we
reason in a group of like-minded fellows aiming at consensus, these features work against us. When, however, we can
turn our sights on one another, we are able to ﬁnd the weak
spots in each other’s arguments. This is the core idea behind
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the “argumentative theory of reason” developed by Hugo
Mercier and Dan Sperber (2011). According to Mercier and
Sperber, human reason developed as a way to increase assurance about the ﬁdelity of communication (2011, 60). We
are able to pick apart potentially deceitful or less than accurate communication from others, and we are disciplined by
the knowledge that others will be able to do the same to us.
Haidt follows Mercier and Sperber in arguing that this feature of our reasoning can be useful in some social and political settings (2013).
If constructive institutional settings can be developed and
reﬁned where motivated groups can debate in front of the
public, we can keep each other honest and motivate ourselves
to look for better and more convincing arguments. As
Mercier and Sperber argue, since people are skilled at both
evaluating and producing arguments, “these skills are displayed most easily in argumentative settings” and “debates
should be especially conducive to good reasoning performance” (2011, 62). Mercier and Sperber (2011, 71–72) show
in a convincing tour of the literature that by reasoning together, or at least against each other, we reason better because
we are able to hold each other accountable. This leads to a
virtuous cycle, an arms race where we seek to develop better
and better arguments and inquire into the weaknesses of our
own arguments. This process neither requires the public to
be reasonable nor guarantees that reasonableness will be the
result. Instead, it is a mechanism for ﬁnding and exposing
error. Even in its purest form in the institutions of science,
the result is not always truth or consensus, but what makes
this mechanism robust is that it always has the means of
discovering its own failings and exposing them by relying on
the incentives of those involved in the dispute.
We might say that it is not by the love of truth that we get
better arguments, but by our desire to convince our fellows
and to be held in high esteem.7 Much work needs to be done
on testing different institutional settings for the purposes
of eliciting the best results along these lines, but the examples
of open parliaments, congresses, and courts provide good
starting points. By using what might seem like a private vice
and turning it into a public virtue, the political institutions
of an open society beneﬁt from the innovation of maximal
diversity, held accountable by this public process.

ROBUSTNESS
Diversity is a precondition of innovation and dynamism in a
society. Accountability harnesses that dynamism into pro-

7. On the importance of esteem, see Brennan and Pettit (2006).

ductive channels. The ﬁnal piece of the puzzle is how diverse
and competing political ideas and values can be more robust
than a less diverse mix. If it is more robust, this will give us
reason to think that more diversity and innovation, harnessed in an accountable way, will make a diverse and dynamic society more secure and better able to deal with unknown challenges. We have already seen one way that
diversity will make societies more robust in that it will encourage and allow innovation. Without knowing what the
future will bring, only with constant innovation will the
material be available to meet future unforeseen challenges.
In addition to innovation and disciplining arguments and
ideas, diversity in institutions makes societies more robust
by bringing a wider range of approaches to bear on a given
topic or issue. This is the advantage that Haidt cites (2013,
chap. 13) when he argues that having liberals, conservatives,
and libertarians together is better than having any of these
groups alone because each approach is lacking a something
that the other has. Liberals are experts in seeking out injustice and harm but, unlike conservatives, do not value tradition or authority; neither group values freedom as much as
libertarians. The others can supplement the blind spots in
one political approach, and having each around makes the
competing viewpoints better off, even though this is hard
to see in the middle of a heated debate. Gaus (2016a, 282)
agrees, arguing that a moral and political order composed of
liberals and conservatives performs better—from a certain
moral point of view—than a homogeneous order of either
alone. Of course there are limits to the amount of diversity
that will be beneﬁcial (Gaus 2018; Gaus and Hankins 2016).
Robustness in a system can be deﬁned as “the maintenance
of system performance either when subjected to external, unpredictable perturbations, or when there is uncertainty about
the values of internal design parameters” (Anderies, Janssen,
and Ostrom 2004, 17). Robustness in this sense is slightly
different from the traditional political notion of stability. A
stable state may or may not be robust. Some stable states are
fragile. We can measure stability, following the standards in
biology and ecology by looking at how easy it is to transition
from one stable state to another, “more stable systems having
higher barriers to switching” (Ives and Carpenter 2007, 58).
This is what is called Holling’s resilience (Holling 1973).
This idea of resilience can be illustrated in the political
context. Imagine three different potentially stable states in
a political society S1, S2, S3. The ﬁrst is the status quo, the
second is an alternative constitution, and the third is a state
of complete disorder with no set constitution. We can imagine
that each alternative is an equilibrium so that if the society is
in one state, there is a tendency to remain there. Each is stable,
but we can imagine that they have different stability properties
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in terms of Holling’s resilience. For instance, it might be easier
to shift from S2 to either S1 or S3. Once the society is either in
the ﬁrst constitution or anarchy, it is harder to shift to S2,
though if society is in S2 it is easy to shift to either the ﬁrst
constitution or anarchy. This situation could lead to oscillation from the second constitution to either constitution one
or anarchy. Even though each state is somewhat stable, the
transition thresholds between states are not uniform, and so
resilience in this case is a complex function of the relationships between each state and threshold.
A system is robust when it can continue to function in
a stable state in the face of some range of perturbations.
Often, robustness is the result of redundancy in the system.
If there is a failure in one area, an overlapping element can
provide the same function. This redundancy can often seem
inefﬁcient if one only considers operation at peak effectiveness, though there may be overriding beneﬁts (Anderies et al.
2004). A robust system will typically not perform as efﬁciently with respect to a chosen set of criteria as its nonrobust
counterpart. However, the robust system’s performance will
not drop off as rapidly as its nonrobust counterpart when
confronted with external disturbance or internal stresses. Political societies must be robust in the same way that a power
grid, nuclear power plant, or airline navigational system should
be. Local failures should be contained and redundant elements
should ﬁll in for nonfunctioning elements. Diversity can help
this goal by creating overlapping functions and institutions
within a society. When the political system is functioning well,
these redundancies may seem messy or inefﬁcient, but when
the system is not functioning well, we can see their beneﬁt. It
is characteristic of social planners and theorists to underestimate the importance of robustness and, thereby, to also underestimate the importance of institutional diversity in the
name of efﬁciency or elegance.
Another important aspect that generates robustness as
well as innovation is federalism. In a federal structure where
localities at various levels have distinct jurisdictions and
administrative preemption, innovation, accountability, and
robustness are ampliﬁed (Bednar 2005, 2009). Federal subdivisions can innovate in their policies in an attempt to reach
better outcomes than their neighbors (Ostrom and Ostrom
1965; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). So long as they
can capture many of the beneﬁts of positive changes and be
harmed by negative ones, localities can compete to attract
residents and businesses. People can “vote with their feet”
and move to more congenial areas (Ostrom et al. 1961;
Tiebout 1956). This incorporates the innovative and inclusive elements of the decentralized system discussed above,
while avoiding some of its problems with implementation.
Localities also tend to be more transparent and responsive to
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their residents, increasing their accountability. By providing
a “laboratory” for democracy in terms of innovation and by
creating an escape valve for poorly functioning localities or
experiments, federalism adds to the robustness of a diverse
society (Levy 2007).
Diversity has certain important beneﬁts, but accepting
those beneﬁts in institutional contexts means that we must
reject the very narrow conception of stability as the property of a system to easily return to a particular equilibrium
when perturbed, at least in the institutional context. This
idea of stability is not compatible with a dynamic and diverse society focused on innovation. Stability needs to be
dynamic or understood as the robustness of the basic constitution of the society to persist, while the institutions themselves may be constantly changing. Diversity disrupts patterns.
The challenge of stability is to show that the existence condition and its corollaries can be maintained in the face of realistic diversity.

POLITICAL CONTRACTUALISM
AND THE OPEN SOCIETY
At this point, it is worth remembering the paradox of diversity for political contractualism that started this investigation. Recall that the problem is the tension between the
necessary contractual conditions of existence and stability.
Reducing diversity makes agreement easier to come by but
less stable. There are two general ways of dealing with this
problem. The ﬁrst is to try to harness or incorporate diversity into the contractual model either in the deliberative
model (Binmore 1994, 1998; Muldoon 2017) or by showing the beneﬁts of diversity in the postcontract institutions
(Bruner 2014; Kukathas 2003; Landemore 2012; Landemore
and Page 2014; Nozick 1974). The second is to eliminate
diversity in some way that allows agreement but that does
not undermine the reason for the contract in the ﬁrst place or
imperil stability (Gaus 2011; Moehler 2014, 2018; Southwood
2010). We saw speciﬁc versions of each of these options in
the last two sections.
Rawls, especially in Political Liberalism, saw the force of
this problem and tried to ﬁnd a middle way. His later solution
hinges heavily on the importance of the idea of “reasonableness” in partitioning and organizing diversity. This is
especially true in the work of latter-day Rawlsian public
reason theorists who increasingly rely on a shared consensus conception of public reason to ﬁlter out unreasonable
views (Cohen 2009; Hadﬁeld and Macedo 2011; Leland and
van Wietmarschen 2012; Quong 2011). This approach, however, has the drawback of solving the paradox by reducing
diversity, making the contract potentially fragile or unstable
in the face of increased diversity. It also has no principled way
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of specifying exactly where and how to draw the lines of
“reasonableness.”8
One potential problem with all of these approaches is that
they attempt to solve the paradox of diversity by limiting
or accepting diversity throughout the contractual system as a
whole. This, however, is itself the root cause of the paradox
since the existence problem is harder to solve at some levels of
abstraction than at others. By breaking the existence problem
into several distinct levels, however, we can perhaps solve the
paradox of diversity without endangering stability. This solution involves changing the target of contractual agreement
from what Rawls (1999b, 235) calls “the well-ordered society” with its ﬁxed-point conception of stability to what I will
call the “open society” with a dynamic conception of stability
(Thrasher and Vallier 2018).9
We will return to the differences in conceptions of stability, but the important difference from the point of view of
the existence problem is that the open society divides contractual labor into several parts, each with a different role and
process. On this approach, diversity is relevant at some stages
but not others. We can think of these three stages as relating
to three levels of political organization: the foundational,
the constitutional, and the institutional. The ﬁrst involves a
foundational limiting principle, while the second establishes
basic rights and powers in a constitutional structure, while
the third is concerned with directly implementing policy.
At the foundational level, the contractors decide the fundamental limiting principle(s) of the society. The limiting
principle is a constraint on the constitutional system. The
limiting principles allow for certain constitutional possibilities and exclude others. In an open society, this will mean,
minimally, that individuals are understood as not having
any natural authority over any other. This is the starting
point of any form of contractualism. Openness as a property
of the society as a whole is not itself a limiting principle.
Instead, it is the result of a principle that does not allow any
person or faction to limit access to political and social institutions on the basis of who they are, rather than what they
8. Compare, for instance, Scanlon’s (1998, 2014) interpretation of
“reasonableness” with Cohen’s (2009) and Gaus’s (1996, 2006). Each is
sophisticated and plausible, but each version is, nevertheless, substantially
different and liable to its own difﬁculties.
9. This speciﬁc conception of the open society is meant to be a competitor to the Rawlsian liberal conception of the well-ordered society. This
distinction is made in detail in Thrasher and Vallier (2018). As the name
suggests, this conception of the good society is inspired by the vision of a free
and dynamic society defended by Karl Popper (2013) and more recently by
Gerald Gaus (2016b). Neither, however, develop a precise vision of open
society. The conception of the open society developed here is heavily inﬂuenced by the idea of an open-access order (North et al. 2009) and the
properties that such an order will have in the face of diversity and change.

do or whom they can persuade. This limiting principle can be
described as an impersonality condition (North, Wallis, and
Weingast 2009). Impersonality protects each individual’s
ability to enter into agreements and to form organizations
in the open society.
Agreement on the limiting principle at this level, however,
is not an overlapping consensus in the Rawlsian sense. The
contractors need not endorse the limiting principle from a
shared conception of their individual accounts of the good.
Instead, they may agree on the basis of unshared, though
convergent, reasons.10 Because of this, at the foundational
level of the contractual model there is no reason to limit
evaluative and informational diversity of the parties (N).
Instead, the diversity of the target of agreement (R) is limited.
Even with maximally diverse agents, agreement on some
basic limiting principle should be possible. The most likely
candidate for a limiting principle is impersonality. Since
it makes no reference to any particular identity it does not
exclude anyone in principle. We may think, however, that
some contractors will have reasons to think that impersonality is illegitimate or is undermined by their other evaluative
concerns. This principle, though, is extremely thin and is
consistent with many different types of societies and ways
of life. Perhaps it is true that some would rather live outside of society than endorse a basic limiting principle of this
sort, but the practical as well as principled reasons for endorsing this limiting principle over no limiting principle seem
overwhelming.
Two important differences between this procedure and
Rawls’s original position are that (1) contractors are not
choosing complete conceptions of justice or regime types and
(2) choice need not be made on the basis of shared reasons.
The foundational limiting principle(s) of a society are much
more limited than what Rawls’s parties choose in the original position. These foundational principle(s) are crucially
important, but theories of justice and regimes are underdetermined by any set of limiting foundational principles.
As Rawls realized in his later work, many conceptions of
justice are compatible, for example, with the idea of freedom
and equality.
The second difference is that choice of the limiting
principles need not be made on the basis of shared reasons.
This second point was mentioned above, but it bears elaborating. In the open society model of political contractualism,
each agent (N) in the contractual model (M) may endorse
the fundamental principle(s) from a diverse point of view or
perspective. So long as they converge on the same limiting
10. On “convergence” justiﬁcation, see, e.g., D’Agostino (1996), Gaus
and Van Schoelandt (2017), and Kogelmann and Stich (2016).
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principle, it is irrelevant whether their reasoning is based on
conventional reasoning (Hardin 2003; Sabl 2012), instrumental reasoning (Moehler 2014, 2018), reasoning from a
moral point of view (Gauthier 2013b, 2013a; Harman 1975;
Harsanyi 1982), or some combination (Gaus 2011). This is
because the limiting principle is not itself a conception of
justice but merely the foundational limits of a constitutional
order. Consensus in the Rawlsian sense is not essential. So
long as they see those principles as legitimate and recognize
that they have reasons to endorse and comply with them, this
is enough.
The next level of contractual agreement is “constitutional,” where basic features of the political society are decided given the background of the limiting principles justiﬁed at the foundational level. The constitution in this sense
speciﬁes the basic political rights and powers of the political
society. These are meant to apply over an indeﬁnite number
of situations and should therefore be very general. Indeed
these rules should be what Hart (1961) called “secondary
rules” for the political system rather than speciﬁc ﬁrst-order
regulations or laws. These rules ﬁx the framework for the
institutions and norms of real political and social life, the
market, and social cooperation. The constitutional level
allows for a more diverse approach when setting up the basic
terms of the political and social constitution of the society.
An important point to note, however, is that both of these
levels of contractual agreement are not ongoing. This has the
beneﬁt of avoiding the instability that the completely unbounded process of contracting might create. This approach,
for instance, can be contrasted with Ryan Muldoon’s (2017)
model of an unconstrained, ongoing social contract. Of
course, the secondary rules of the constitution will have rules
for how the rules themselves will be changed, but a process
for changing rules is not the same thing as an ongoing constitutional convention. In a sense the constitutional rules
are always subject to change, but these changes are made as
problems arise, not through a regular ongoing process.
Once the limiting principle and the constitutional structure have been selected, there is still the question of the exact
nature of the institutions that determine the speciﬁc, primary
rules that govern social life. Even within the constraints set at
the foundational and constitutional levels, there is a wealth of
different institutional possibilities, considerable indeterminacy, and room for variation. Institutions operate in a context determined by the constitutional structure, the beliefs
and values of their citizens, and their historical context. The
role of the theorists at this stage is to provide comparative
institutional analysis and to evaluate the basic ideas of the
constitution in the context of the beliefs and norms of the
particular society.
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The evaluative and informational diversity that was dampened in the constitutional level by the practical need for general, impersonal rules that can apply over an indeﬁnite number
of individuals, organizations, and cases reemerges at this
stage. People as they are must be the material for actual institutions, and it is implausible to reduce the diversity of their
viewpoints for the purposes of institutional comparison. The
historical context will also be important in the creation of
speciﬁc social rules. These institutions and the organizations
that are formed in this context will create new situations that
will often require constitutional changes. In this way, the
institutional level will also inﬂuence the constitutional. The
relationship between diversity and the different contractual
levels in the open society is represented in ﬁgure 2.
Although this is only a sketch of the open society as a
model of political contractualism, it has some important
features worth highlighting. The ﬁrst is that it is the political
conception of the basic structure of society. The basic rights
do not reference morality as an independent area of investigation or justiﬁcation. They also do not require underlying
moral disagreement to justify them as in Moehler’s (2018)
multilevel contract theory.11 Second, the foundational limiting principle(s) generated at the initial level are meant to
be perfectly general and invariant to additional diversity.
This is the point of allowing maximal diversity in at the
foundational level since the existence and stability problem
in this way are united, at least at the foundational level. Third,
this theory moves much of the importance of political contractualism from the highest, foundational, level where it is
typically located in contemporary contractual theories to the
constitutional and, importantly, the institutional level.
One question is whether the idea presented here is merely
a variation of Rawls’s “four-stage sequence” from A Theory of
Justice. Although there is an obvious similarity in form, there
are important differences. Rawls sees the four-stage sequence
as a framework “to simplify the application of the two principles of justice” (1999b, 171) and as a more informationally rich “elaboration of the original position” (1999b, 172).
Once the parties have selected the principles of justice in
the original position, they move to their application in a

11. There are many differences between Moehler’s multilevel contract
theory and the one defended here. The ﬁrst is that the open society is a form
of political contractualism that makes no direct reference to morality or
moral disagreement. Moehler requires moral disagreement at the lower level
to generate the need to ascend to the instrumental level; the open society
does not require or reference moral disagreement. Further, the principles
generated in Moehler’s contract (e.g., the weak principle of universalization
and the stabilized Nash bargaining solution) go far beyond what the foundational level of the contract in the open society justiﬁes.
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Figure 2. Diversity in the open society model

constitutional convention. The important point to note is
that the principles are already chosen by the time of the
constitutional selection; this is not true in the constitutional
contract described above. The foundational contract only
assigns the basic limiting principles of the society (e.g., impersonality). Unlike the ﬁrst stage of the four-stage sequence,
no determinate conception of justice is agreed to in the
foundational contract.
Another important difference is that informational and
evaluative diversity is not excluded in the foundational
contract, unlike in the four-stage sequence. Since there is
maximal diversity at this stage, contractors would limit disagreement in this stage by focusing on the highest-level
limiting principle as a target of agreement without limiting
diversity. Importantly, this reduction of disagreement is part
of the process of contracting, not a modeling assumption
about the values and knowledge of the contractors themselves—no veil of any level of thickness is required.
The ﬁnal difference concerns Rawls’s conception of the
four-stage sequence and its relation to the principles of justice. In an important footnote, Rawls (1999b, 173 n. 3) distinguishes his approach in the four-stage sequence from the
contractualism of Buchanan and Tullock in The Calculus of
Consent (1999). As he puts it, the goal of the four-stage sequence is to assist in application of an already agreed upon
conception of justice, “the aim is to characterize a just constitution,” not to show that such a constitution would be
agreed to “under more or less realistic (though simpliﬁed)
assumptions about political life” (1999b, 173). This is a crucial difference between the contractual theory developed
here and Rawls’s four-stage sequence. It is exactly this sharp
distinction between the existence and stability problems in
Rawls (and other contract theories) that I have argued creates
the paradox of diversity in the ﬁrst place. The goal of the contractual theory presented here is to incorporate questions
of stability into the existence question, thereby fusing the
two types of questions that Rawls seeks to keep distinct.
It might seem that by incorporating concerns about stability into the existence question, the normativity of resulting

contractual agreement will be undermined. On the contrary,
the normative force of the contractual agreement depends on
how closely the reasons of the representative contractors are
to the reasons of actual people to whom the contract theory is
meant to apply. The link between these two sets of reasons is
the normative link that allows this approach to serve as a
justiﬁcation for political institutions (see ﬁg. 1). Making the
tests for stability and existence harder by fusing them and
allowing maximal diversity at the outset assures, in a way
that other contractual theories cannot, that this approach is
both maximally inclusive and robust. As a political standard
for a liberal society, inclusivity is certainly a virtue, especially
in modern pluralistic societies like our own. Robustness is
assured since it is unlikely that some additional diversity will
arise that was not already captured in the initial contractual
situation. Both of these features should also enhance the
stability of the contract.
It is the fusing of the existence and stability problems in
the various levels of this approach that allows the open society to avoid the paradox of diversity that other forms of
contractualism are susceptible to. At the foundational level,
these questions are answered together, while at the constitutional and institutional level, the openness that is protected
by the limiting principle allows the three beneﬁts of openness (innovation, accountability, and robustness) to generate
and reinforce their own support over time. The chief difference between the open society and contractual theories of
liberalism or justice is precisely in the fact that no ﬁxed-point
conception of justice is agreed to in the open society’s model
of political contractualism. The open society, in this way
avoids the fragility of ﬁxed-point conceptions of justice as
well as the instability inherent in societies whose basic terms
are always in question.

DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL CONTRACTUALISM
I have argued that diversity creates an essential tension at
the heart of social contract theory embodied in what I have
called the paradox of diversity. To solve this problem, I
proposed a form of multilevel political contractualism that
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I have called “the open society.” This approach solves the
paradox by incorporating diversity into the social contract
at different degrees at different levels, solving the existence
problem while preserving stability in a dynamic, robust way.
In addition, the focus on the institutional beneﬁts of diversity
in democratic contractualism point in the direction of how
real institutions can harness diversity.
The open society model, if it is as viable as I have argued,
shows that there are great advantages to living in a society
characterized by signiﬁcant and deep disagreement, if society
is organized to take advantage of those beneﬁts. As I have
argued, it is essential that this disagreement and diversity
take place in a constitutional structure that secures basic
rights and creates a stable setting for dynamic institutions. In
such a setting, disagreement and diversity are essential because they correct the blind spots we each have and introduce
new ideas that help us see further than we might have on our
own. It turns out that we need each other more than we think,
not despite our disagreements, but because of them.
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